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Economic analysis has identified two broad classes of takeovers.
The first is what we call disciplinary takeovers, the purpose of which
seems to be to correct the non-value-maximizing (NVM) practices of
managers of the target firms. These practices might include excessive
growth and diversification, lavish consumption of perquisites, over-
payment to employees and suppliers, or debt avoidance to secure a
"quiet life." Disciplinary takeovers thus address the problem of what
Williamson (1964) has called discretionary behavior by managers and
Jensen (1986a) has christened "the agency cost of free cash how."
Because disciplinary takeovers are designed to replace or change the
policies of managers who do not maximize shareholder value, the actual
integration of the businesses of the acquirer and the target is not really
essential. The takeover is only the most effective way to change control
and with it the target's operating strategy.
The second class of takeovers can be loosely called synergistic, since
the motivating force behind them is the possibility of benefits from
combining the businesses of two firms. Synergy gains can come from
increases in market power, from offsetting the profits of one firm with
the tax loss carryforwards of the other, from combining R&D labs or
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marketing networks, or from simply eliminating functions that are corn- made, T
mon to the two firms. Unlike in disciplinary takeovers, the integration of the bi
of the two businesses is essential for realizing the gains in synergistic escape
takeovers. unsoljcj
It is important to note from the start that the gains in synergistic mood b
takeovers could well be gains for the managers as much as for the that
shareholders. For example, when managers launch diversification pro- classjfi(
grams, they may be creating no value for shareholders but only sat- The r
isfying their own preferences for growth. The point nonetheless remains charact
that the acquiring firm is seeking a combination of the operations or focuses
cash flows of the two firms and not an improvement of the target, as hostile
• in disciplinary takeovers, board o
• This paper attempts to verify the conjecture that disciplinary take- and in
overs are often hostile and synergistic takeovers are often friendly. We to an a
assemble evidence showing that targets of hostile (friendly) bids have and a h
the ownership and asset characteristics that one would expect of the of the f
targets of disciplinary (synergistic) takeovers. We interpret this cvi- and pa
dence as showing that, at least to some extent, the motive for a takeover ership.
determines its mood. with a
The claim that hostility and friendliness typically reflect two different acquisi
takeover motives is by no means clear-cut. Some diversification- some
motivated takeovers undoubtedly run into resistance from managers not sui
of the targeted firms, who are unhappy either with expected changes mood.
in operations or with the compensation they receive for giving up con- Sec
trol. Similarly, some takeovers launched to change the target's oper- the fir
ating strategy proceed with the consent of the target's managers, who acquir
obtain lucrative enough rewards to give up control peacefully, or else
simply want to retire. These grey areas suggest the possibility that withir
variation in the monetary incentives of managers across targeted firms
can completely account for mood differences from acquisition to ac- gets a
quisition. Walkling and Long (1984) seem to take this view. In contrast, terms
we show that there are numerous characteristics, in addition to mea- The
sures of the financial incentives offered to the incumbent managers, that s:
that differ across hostile and friendly acquisitions. Moreover, these are takeo
the differences one would expect to find between the targets of disci- poor
plinary takeovers and those of synergistic takeovers. takeo
The analysis of this paper is based on the sample of all publicly tracti
traded Fortune 500firmsas of 1980. Of the 454 firms in the sample, 82
were acquired by third parties or underwent a management buyout in Sec
the years 1981—85. Based on an examination of the Wall Street Journal teristi
Index, 40 of those takeovers appear to have started out hostile and 42 result
friendly. We call an acquisition hostile of the initial bid for the target amot
(which need not be a bid from the eventual buyer) was neither nego- than
tiated with its board prior to being made nor accepted by the board as indus103 Characteristics of Targets of Hostile and Friendly Takeovers
corn- made. Thus, initial rejection by the target's board is taken as evidence
Ltion of the bidder's hostility, as is active management resistance to the bid,
:istic escape to a "white knight," or a management buyout in response to
unsolicited pressure. We sort acquisitions on the basis of the initial
istic mood because we are interested in the source of the takeover gains
the that sparked the bidding in the first place. Acquisitions that are not
pro- classified as hostile are called friendly.
sat- The remaining sections of the paper examine ownership and financial
ains characteristics of the firms in the 1980 Fortune 500sample.Section 4.2
s or focuses on the ownership characteristics of targets of friendly and
t, as hostile acquisitions. "Friendly targets" appear to have much higher
board ownership than either "hostile targets" or the rest of the sample,
ake- and in particular much higher ownership by the top officers. Compared
We to an average firm in the sample, a friendly target is much more likely,
ave and a hostile target much less likely, to be run by a founder or a member
the of the founder's family. Furthermore, the probability of an acquisition,
evi- and particularly of a friendly acquisition, rises with management own-
ver ership. In fact, the intentional exit of the founding family or of a CEO
with a very large stake in the firm is a frequent impetus for a friendly
ent acquisition in our sample. Although the results on ownership identify
jon- some clear differences between hostile and friendly targets, they do
;ers not suggest a definite link between the motive for a takeover and its
ges mood.
on- Section 4.3 examines the asset and performance characteristics of
per- the firms in the sample. The results suggest that the targets of friendly
acquisitions have aTobin's q comparable to that of nontargets, but that
Ise hostile targets have a lower q. Hostile targets not only have a low q
hat within their industry but also are concentrated in low-q industries.
ms Friendly targets are younger and faster growing firms than hostile tar-
ac- gets and are basically indistinguishable from the sample as a whole in
LSt, terms of performance variables.
ea- These results are the basic evidence consistent with our conjecture
rs, that synergistic takeovers are more likely to be friendly and disciplinary
are takeovers are more likely to be hostile. Hostile targets appear to be
C1 poor performers, as we would expect of candidates for the disciplinary
takeovers. In contrast, it seems less likely that the match-specific at-
dy tractions of synergistic targets would be easily captured by basic per-
82 formance measures.
in Section 4.4 presents probit estimates of the effects of firm charac-
teristics on the probability of a hostile or friendly acquisition. The
42 results confirm that a firm with a low market value relative to the
amount of fixed assets it holds is more likely to become a hostile target
10- than the average firm. This appears to be largely accounted for by an
as industry effect and not just by a particularly low valuation within the104Randall Mórck,AndreiShleifer, and Robert W. Vishny los
industry. Controlling for size, top officer ownership, and Tobin's q, We
find that the presence of the founding family reduces the likelihood of which
hostile bids, but does not raise that of friendly bids. Large management see w
stakes in the target, on the other hand, do more to encourage friendly target
acquisitions than to discourage hostile ones. Tht
Section 4.5takesa separate look at management buyouts. These has b
deals deserve special attention because they cannot be motivated by that c
synergistic gains. We define hostile management buyouts as deals done are n
in response to a third party bid or filing of a Schedule 13d with an consi
expression of intent to seek control. Friendly management buyouts, acqui
then, are transactions in which such pressure is not apparent. Because prese
our sample of these buyouts is quite small, accurate statistical inference on th
is impossible; all we can do is eyeball the data. Except for the fact that way,
leveraged buyouts are, on average, much smaller transactions than
others, the differences between friendly and hostile management buy- Th
outs largely mimic the differences between friendly and hostile acqui- and
sitions more generally. The external pressure that prompts defensive (Wal
• management buyouts seems likely to be an attempt to discipline the repo
management. Friendly management buyouts, however, seem more likely cent
to be done for tax reasons or possibly to buy undervalued shares, over
We interpret this study as furnishing some evidence consistent with to a'
the view that hostile targets and friendly targets are very different types 198(
of companies. Whereas the targets of friendly bids appear to be a wide
range of firms in many industries, the targets of hostile bids are usually posi
older, more slowly growing firms that are valued much below the re- do
placement cost of their tangible assets. Friendly acquisitions could be siti
motivated by corporate diversification, synergies, and, as our results 198
suggest, the life-cycle decisions of a founder or a manager with a dom- ow
inant stake. Bidders in hostile transactions may be more interested in 1
shutting down, selling off, or redepreciating the physical capital of the sta
target than they are in continuing business as usual. In addition to the the
possible heterogeneity of financial incentives, managers' resistance to exe
takeovers may be related to their unwillingness to accept the particular firn
changes sought by the bidder, often leading them to seek a white knight mil
or a management buyout. In short, the evidence is consistent with our
notion that the source of gains from a takeover can determine its mood. an
inc
4.2Ownership Structure and Acquisitions
In this section we present ownership characteristics of the 1980 For- ou
• tune 500 firms that were acquired in the subsequent five years. Recent an
empirical research (Demsetz and Lehn 1985; Shleifer and Vishny, wi
forthcoming) has documented the incidence of substantial managerial pe
ownership of large industrial corporations. These studies have not,105Characteristics of Targets of Hostile and Friendly Takeovers
s q, we however, focused on the ownership structure of acquisition targets,
iood of which is the task of this section. Evidence on ownership enables us to
see whether the managers of nontargets, hostile targets, and friendly
riendly targets have different financial interests in an acquisition.
The relationship between management ownership and takeover mood
These has been previously examined by Walkling and Long (1984), who found
ted by that changes in managers' personal wealth from a successful acquisition
s done are negatively related to the decision to resist. In our analysis we also
'ith an consider the impact of management ownership on the probability of an
yOUts, acquisition, be it hostile or friendly, as well as the influence of the
presence of a founding family and of the chairman of the board's age
on the probability of either a hostile or a friendly acquisition. In this
that way, we hope to obtain a more complete picture of the function of
than managers' financial incentives in takeovers.
t buy- Throughout this analysis we try to avoid sample selection problems,
acqui- and to this end we begin with all publicly traded 1980 Fortune 500 firms
(Walkling and Long might have an unrepresentative sample since they
ie the reported abnormally high initial stakes for the acquiring firms: 11 per-
likely cent for contested offers and 27 percent for uncontested offers). More-
over, because we are interested in differences between firms, we try
t with to avoid the question of cyclical variation and compare all firms as of
types 1980. In the case of ownership, data come from the 1980 Corporate
wide Data Exchange (CDE) directory, which contains data on the ownership
positions of board members as well as large outside shareholders. We
ie re- do not have data on executive compensation or on the ownership po-
Id be sitions taking the form of options; many studies (for example, Murphy
1985) indicate that changes in executive wealth resulting from stock
dorn- ownership are large relative to those from other sources.
ed UI The first measure of ownership we use is the combined percentage
f the stake of the board of directors. Because of the nature of CDE reporting,
o the the stakes are added up over only those board members whose positions
ce to exceed 0.2 percent. This may lead to some problems for the largest
cular firms, where even the tiniest percentage ownership positions are worth
night millions of dollars.
I our To the extent that the board makes the decision whether to resist
ood. an offer, the board's stake may be the appropriate measure of financial
incentives. In addition to this measure, we divide the board ownership
into that of the top two officers and that of the rest of the board. The
first captures the interest of the top officers, whose concern for the
For- outcome of a bid might go well beyond their personal capital gain,
cent and the second captures the interest of important decision makers
who might care little about the outcome of a bid except for their
enal personal financial gain. These two measures complement the board's
flOt, stake as a whole in that they reflect the pecuniary gain of the two106Randall NltSrck, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny
constituencies on the board with possibly different attitudes toward 'flti
the acquisition. perc
Other personal characteristics of board members might influence two
their attitude toward the firm's being acquired independent of their boa
ownership stake. First, top officers who are founders or members of ngh
the founding family might play a special role in the company, either 0.61
because they command the loyalty of shareholders and employees or mag
because their attachment to the company ismore than just financial. offli
For this reason, it seemed useful to ask what fraction of friendly and AIm
hos tile takeover targets were run by a member of the founding family. of ii
This is of particular interest in the context of executive succession, Yoti
since sale of the company might be a natural means for a founder's F
retirement. For a similar reason, we are interested in the age of the diff
board chairman, since his retirement plans might influence his attitude The
toward the sale of the company. pan
Recall that we term an acquisition hostile if it was not negotiated 10.9
prior to the initial bid, was not accepted by the board from the start, avei
or was contested by the target management in any way. This category boa
thus includes acquisitions by white knights.It also includes man- stat
agement buyouts that were precipitated by a bid or a 13d filing targ
expressing the intent to acquire control, since such pressure is clearly the
hostile (Shleifer and Vishny 1988). Our calling a target hostile when- duff
ever there is any evidence of the board's rejection of the initial offer At
may misclassify as hostile some situations in which the board is only
attempting to obtain a higher bid. Because there are only three
transactions in our sample where resistance was limited simply to val
a rejection of the first offer, we proceed using this classification. tha
Our classification records a transaction as friendly either if there is All
no evidence of resistance from the target management to the first
prospective acquirer or if the management implemented a manage-
ment buyout and we have no evidence of a hostile threat. Again, age
the classification is far from perfect since the target's management
may have been coerced into going along in the face of imminent 241
defeat. for
Although section 4.5 below presents some evidence to the effect that in I
it is appropriate to include hostile and friendly management buyouts —2
in the general samples of hostile and friendly transactions, we try to of
be cautious and present many of the results both including and ex- sar
cluding these buyouts from the samples of targets. Unless noted other- bu:
wise, our discussion will concern the results for the case in which
management buyouts (MBOs, in the tables) are included. Sal
Table 4. la presents the means and medians of various ownership
variables for different groups of companies, and table 4. lb gives md
statistics for tests of the differences of means between these groups. ma107 Characteristicsof Targets of Hostile and Friendly Takeovers
ard In the whole sample the board of directors owned on average 10.9
percent of the company; 6.3 percent was the average stake of the top
ce two officers, and 4.5 percent was the average stake of the rest of the
eir board. Not surprisingly, the ownership positions are skewed to the
of right: the medians for the above three measures were 3.54 percent,
icr 0.61 percent, and 1.09 percent respectively. One way to describe the
or magnitude of these stakes is that the average value of the top two
officers' positions was $40.5 million and the median was $2.26 million.
Almost a quarter of the companies in the sample were run by members
of the founding family, and the average chairman of the board was a
)fl youthful58 years old.
From the viewpoint of ownership, the friendly targets were very
he different both from the sample as a whole and from the hostile targets.
de The boards of the friendly targets owned over 20 percent of the com-
pany, on average, which is statistically significantly more than both the
ed 10.9 percent average board ownership in the sample and the 8.3 percent
rt average of the hostile targets. The hostile targets had, on average, less
board ownership than the whole sample, though this difference is not
statistically significant. The greater board ownership among the friendly
ng targets came from the greater ownership of the top officers. In fact,
ly the stakes of outside board members do not seem to have been much
different from either those in the hostile targets or in the whole sample.
er At the 15-percent confidence level, the hostile targets seem to have
ly had less top officer ownership than did the average firm. The difference
ee in officer positions is even more dramatic if one looks at the dollar
to values of the stake, where the average for a friendly target was twice
that for the sample as a whole, and nine times that for a hostile target.
is All these results are echoed in the medians as well, although not as
dramatically.
e- The incidence of a member of the founding family on the top man-
n, agement team was also very high in friendly targets, showing up as an
nt impressive 40 percent. This is statistically significantly higher than the
nt 24 percent average for the sample as a whole and the 10 percent average
for the hostile targets. The incidence of the founding family's presence
at in hostile targets was low relative to the sample, with a t-statistic of
ts —2.23. There does not seem to be any significant difference in the age
to of the chairman or in the outside board ownership between the full
sample and friendly and hostile targets. But when the management
buyouts are not classified as acquisitions, we find that the chairmen of
hostile targets were slightly younger than the average chairman in the
sample, perhaps suggesting that the younger managers were more likely
jp to strike a favorable deal with a white knight or fight harder to remain
independent, while the older managers were more apt to rely on the
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Before interpreting these results, we should explicitly acknowledge
that the means we compute are only intended to be suggestive, Since
in their calculation we do not control for important differences between
firms. For example, firms with very small ownership are larger firms
that are less likely to be acquired. Without a multivariate analysis,
some of the correlations we describe might be spurious. We deal with
these issues in section 4.4 but in the meantime proceed as if the evidence
is indicative of the causal relationship between ownership and takeovers.
One interpretation of the results presented so far is that the man-
agement teams with strong financial incentives to accept a tender offer
at a premium do not resist. This is supported by the fact that the boards
of friendly targets had higher stakes and the boards of hostile targets
had lower stakes than the sample average. Moreover, the entire dif-
ference is basically accounted for by the differential ownership of the
top officers. Since officers have more to lose as a result of an acquisition
than do other board members, looking at top officers rather than whole
boards may be more powerful in explaining the resistance strategy
adopted.
An alternative interpretation of the findings on friendly offers is that
management teams with very high ownership have close to a veto power
over the outcome of the bid, and that therefore the only acquisitions
with high management ownership we observe are friendly. This is cor-
roborated by the fact that the firms whose founders were present were
more likely to be the targets of friendly bids, since the founders might
have had a stronger preference for control as well as a better ability
to resist. The two interpretations are not, of course, incompatible.
Companies might be targets of friendly offers both because managers
have a great incentive to succumb and because if they chose not to,
the offer could not succeed.
The latter view suggests that a number of would-be hostile offers
end up as friendly offers because of the necessity to bribe the en-
trenched managers. This view does not, however, explain the higher
incidence of total acquisitions among high-ownership firms that we find
in the data. Table 4.2a presents the numbers and probabilities of various
types of acquisitions for firms with special ownership structures, and
table 4.2b provides some hypothesis tests. Table 4.2a shows that,
whereas the probability of a non-MBO acquisition within five years
was 14.5 percent in the sample as a whole, it was 19.7 percent if the
officer stake exceeded 15 percent. If management buyouts are included,
the probability that a firm with over 15 percent officer ownership would
be acquired exceeds that for a firm with under 15 percent ownership
by II percent, with a t-statistic of 2. Il. That large stakes invite bids
suggests that the managers' incentive to sell was probably a factor in










































































































































































































































































































































































































112Randall Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny
Table 4.2b Differences between Acquisition Probabilities for Various
OwnershipCategories (r-Statistics for tests of equality of
acquisition probabilities in parentheses)
All Non-MBO
AcquisitionsAcquisitions
Probability of vs.Probability of — .0690 — .0575
hostile acquisition hostile acquisition (—2.23) (—2.06)
Founder =I Founder = 0
Probability of vs.Probability of .0803 .0678
friendly acquisition friendly acquisition (2.55) (2.37)
Founder =I Founder = 0
Probability of vs.Probability of .0114 .0 103
any acquisition any acquisition (.270) (.27)
Founder =I Founder = 0
Probability of vs.Probability of — .0499 .0293
hostile acquisition hostile acquisition (— 1.32) (— .858)
OFF>.15
Probability of vs.Probability of .1577 .0896
friendly acquisition friendly acquisition (4.16) (2.57)
OFF>.15
Probability of vs.Probability of .1078 .0604
any acquisition any acquisition (2.11) (1.29)
OFF>.15
OFF= percentage ownership stake of the top officer of the firm.
Thereason why companies with very high officer ownership have a
higher likelihood of being acquired is that they have a much higher
likelihood of a friendly bid. The probability that a firm with at least 15
percent top officer ownership was acquired in a friendly non-MBO
transaction is 15.2 percent versus 6.2 percent for firms with officer
ownership below 15 percent. This difference between high and low
officer ownership firms is significant at the 1 percent level (t =2.57).
On the other hand, the probability that a non-MBO acquisition would
be initiated in a hostile manner is 4.5 percent for high officer ownership
firms versus 7.4 percent for firms with less than 15 percent top officer
ownership, a difference which is not statistically significant.
These results suggest the possibility that the ownership structure of
some firms makes them especially attractive targets of friendly take-
overs. For example, if a top officer with a large equity stake wants to
retire and simultaneously take some of his wealth out of the firm, he
will probably prefer selling out at a premium to a diversification-minded
acquirer to selling his shares on the open market. Life-cycle decisions
of the officers thus may provide a stimulus for friendly bids.113 Characteristics of Targets of Hostile and Friendly Takeovers
Furtherevidence on this point comes from the results on founders.
Table 4.2a shows that the probability of any acquisition of a firm run
by the founding family is not much different from that of an average
— companyin the sample. The likelihood of a friendly bid, however, is
much higher for founders' firms, and that of a hostile bid is much lower.
— Forthe entire sample the probability of a hostile non-MBO acquisition
is 7.0 percent, and the probability of a friendly non-MBO acquisition
is 7.5 percent. For firms run by founding families, in contrast, the
likelihood of a friendly bid is 12.6 percent and that of a hostile bid is
2.7 percent. The probability of a friendly bid is statistically significantly
higher for firms with founding families than for firms without (t2.37),
and the probability of a hostile bid is significantly lower (t= —2.06).
If founders can effectively deter hostile bids, and end up selling their
firms when they intend to leave the business, such results might be
expected.
A final piece of statistical evidence that corroborates the top man-
agement exit story concerns the age of the chairman. Although the
average chairman in our sample was 58.4 years old, and the average
chairman of a firm with a founding family member at the helm was
59.7, the average chairman in firms that were run by the founding family
and sold to a friendly acquirer was 62.6 years old. These findings are
consistent with the notion that founders who sell off their firms before
retirement should on average be older.
An examination of the stories of individual companies confirms the
statistical evidence. A common story (for example, ABC, Beckman
Instruments, Clark Oil, and others) is an elderly founder wishing to
a sell the business before he retires. In fact, of the 14 founder-run firms
r that were acquired by another party in a friendly transaction over the
5 period in question, one was the case of bankruptcy, one of a need to
get money to pay inheritance taxes, one of a super-manager merging
r into a larger firm to get a bigger job, and the rest of founders or of
their family members wishing to get out.
If an important part of friendly acquisitions is simply a personal life-
cycle decision of top management, it is natural to ask how high takeover
premia can be paid in such transactions. One possibility is misman-
r agement under the founder's reign, such as insufficient risk taking,
insufficient expansion to maintain high fractional equity ownership, or
f just poor decision making. In this case the founder's exit is accom-
panied by a disciplinary takeover. An alternative possibility is that the
takeover is synergistic but the desire of managers to run their own
show often precludes such combinations. The founder's wish to get
out provides the impetus for realizing the already available gains. Some
evidence shedding light on these two possibilities is presented in the
next section.114Randall Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny 115
4.3Financial Characteristics of the Targets
The financial motivation of the target's management is unlikely to this
be the only factor entering into the decision to oppose a tender offer. olde
Some acquisitions might be undertaken for reasons management par- that
ticularly dislikes, such as its own replacement or the liquidation of the Si
firm. In this section we pursue such possible heterogeneity of acqui-
sition targets. 1001
The starting point of our analysis is Tobin's q. As the ratio of the GL
market value of the firm to the replacement cost of its tangible assets, valu
Tobin's q can be viewed as measuring the intangible assets of the firm. or
These may include future growth opportunities, monopoly power, qual- IT
ity of management, goodwill, rents appropriated away from unions, a fr
and so on. Since we are looking at the measured q, this interpretation hos
can be troublesome. The replacement cost of assets 'could be over- hok
stated, for example, if the firm bought its assets a long time ago and ites,
their value has depreciated significantly because of technological prog- of v
ress, foreign competition, or other changes. In these cases the inflation- exp
adjusted historical cost is a poor guide to the true replacement cost, face
but a very low q is probably still a reliable indicator of a declining firm. and
Alternatively, q might just capture the mispricing by the stock market
of the firm's physical assets in their current use. If, however, a low q
genuinely measures the low valuation of the firm's tangible assets in S
their current use, it may pay to sell off assets when q is low because con
those assets have a higher value in another firm or sector. Even when nev
the firm's capital is highly firm- or sector-specific, it may pay simply
to abandon the unprofitable capacity or insist on a reduction in union and
wages that were set under more profitable conditions.
A related measure of profitability relative to the value of physical
assets is the deviation of a firm's q from the average q of its three-digit arg
(Standard Industrial Classification code) industry, Dq. The market might trat
attach low value to the assets of the whole industry, and it could attach acq
an even lower value to the assets of a particular firm within that in- fim
dustry. If the market does the latter, we must look at the firm's idio- the
syncratic characteristics, such as its management, as a source of potential of
acquisition gains. Loi
Tobin's q can shed light on the hypothesis that hostile acquisitions to
are essentially purchases of old physical assets that can be redeployed Noi
more profitably elsewhere either from an efficiency or a tax viewpoint. vat
If a low q reflects a low valuation of physical assets relative to their imi
potential, acquiring the firm might be a cost-effective way to buy and cau
redeploy its physical capital. In the same vein we look at the age of ers
the firm, which might give us an idea of the age of its capital. Apart am115 Characteristicsof Targets of Hostile and Friendly Takeovers
from serving as an indicator of a declining firm, the age of the capital
stock is a proxy for the potential for a step up in the basis from which
ly to this capital can be redepreciated. From the tax viewpoint acquiring
ffer. older assets is more advantageous; Shleifer and Vishny (1988) argue
par- that such tax considerations can be important in management buyouts.
f the Since Tobin's q might be mismeasured, we are also interested in
:qui- other potential measures of the firm's performance. In particular, we
look at a ten-year growth rate of the firm's work force, GL. If q and
'the GL are simultaneously low, we are more confident in attributing low
sets, valuation to past or current troubles rather than to mismeasurement
irm. or market mispricing.
ual- In two effective papers, Michael Jensen (l986a, l986b) has proposed
ons, a free cash flow theory of low stock market valuation of targets of
tion hostile takeovers. In his theory, because some firms waste share-
ver- holders' wealth on unprofitable investments and managerial perquis-
and ites, eliminating this waste can create shareholder value. An example
rog- ofwasted free cash flow, proposed by Jensen and by Jacobs (1986), is
0fl- exploration activity in the oil industry that did not slow down in the
)St, face of changing economic conditions. Jensen suggested that interest
m. and dividend payments alleviate the problem of free cash flow. In this
ket regard he points to the role of debt as a means to commit future cor-
vq porate revenues to being paid out.
in Strictly speaking, to be properly tested, Jensen's theory requires
ise controlling for a variety of aspects of the firm's opportunity set. We
ien nevertheless check what fraction of their earnings nontargets, hostile
targets, and friendly targets allocate to dividends, interest payments,
Ofl and investment. The question is whether higher payouts and lower
investment preclude hostile action.
:al Another important strand in the discussion of corporate acquisitions
git argues that capital market imperfections can deter otherwise feasible
ht transactions. A firm with a large market value could be difficult to
ch acquire, especially without the cooperation of its management, because
fl- financial markets might be unable to supply the credit necessary for
0- the acquisition. This view attributes the lively hostile takeover activity
of the 1980s at least in part to the appearance of junk bond financing.
Looking at the market values of acquired firms should thus enable us
IS to appraise the extent to which capital market imperfections matter.
Not surprisingly, all types of targets have fewer assets and lower market
t. valuesthan do firms that are not acquired, indicating that capital market
ir imperfections might deter some corporate control transactions. Be-
d cause market value is correlated with both q and management own-
ership, we defer further discussion of this issue to the multivariate
analysis section.116Randall Mórck, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny in
The means and medians of the variables of interest by the type of are
firm are presented in table 4.3a, with the t-tests of differences of means the
in table 4.3b. Recall that all the variables are measured at the end of
1980. The average Tobin's q of the sample is .848, which is the standard and
result of the low valuation of corporate assets by the stock market in tan
1980. The average q of a friendly target is .796, which is not significantly
below that of the sample. In contrast, the average q of a hostile target I
is only .524,whichis significantly below .848 (t =— 2.84).A similar Do
pattern emerges in the medians. ati
Unfortunately, a variety of interpretations are consistent with this UP
result. The first possibility is that hostile targets were mismanaged and the
therefore had a low Tobin's q. The result of such mismanagement is sisi
the inefficient utilization of the fixed assets of the firm and in turn the agt
low valuation of these assets by the market. Removing the management
might justify the takeover premium, although the managers would prob- to
ably resist because they would not want to lose control or to have their
incompetence revealed. Managers of friendly targets, in contrast, are we
safe; they do not need to worry about being removed. co
Mismanagement can come in two forms. It can be a firm-specific or re
an industrywide phenomenon. In the former case what should matter TI
for hostility is the extent to which the firm underperforms similar firms. ac
To some extent this difference is measured by Dq. In fact, the mean
of Dq is positive for friendly targets and negative for hostile ones, with ca
the difference significant at the 10 percent level (t =1.72).On the If
other hand, the differences in the medians are much smaller. To as-
certain whether the industry effect or the firm effect is more important al
in predicting hostile activity, the next section presents some probit
estimates.
An alternative interpretation of the extremely low Tobin's q's of the
hostile firms is that, while the assets may be managed properly, they
simply are not particularly valuable. For example, if the hostile targets
V
investeda long time ago when their industry was growing, but now the ti
fortunes of the industry have turned around, they will be stuck with a g
lot of capital. Under this scenario hostile targets might be in smokestack
SI
industries ruined by technological progress and foreign competition.
Consistent with this view is the finding that the hostile targets were
g
older and more slowly growing than the average firm in the sample. 0
The difference in the year of incorporation between hostile targets and
b
other firms was over six years, and it is significant at the 6 percent a
level. The difference in the growth rates of the work force was 1.4
percent (or almost twofold), which is significant at the 12 percent level.
Friendly targets, in contrast, were younger than the average firm and
were growing at roughly the same rate.
Although this view suggests why firms with a great deal of old, fixed
S
capital would have a low Tobin's q, it does not explain why these firms117Characteristicsof Targets of Hostile and Friendly Takeovers
f are attractive candidates for hostile acquisitions. One explanation is e 0 the free cash flow theory. If low-q industries are in decline, managers
iflS may be too slow to close down or sell off plants, curtail investment,
I°d and trim down operations. There is some evidence that the hostile
targets were investing a smaller fraction of earnings than the average
firm in the sample (: =—1.86).
II If managers' dedication to the survival of organizations, stressed by
Donaldson and Lorsch (1983), keeps them from shrinking their oper-
1 ations sufficiently fast, then acquirers can increase value by speeding
this up the decline of the target company. Our numbers on the growth of
and the work force, the incorporation year, investment, and q are all con-
sistent with the version of the free cash flow theory that stresses man-
the agement's tendency to disinvest too slowly.
tent Another reason why old tangible assets could attract acquirers has
ob- to do with taxes. An important feature of the pre-1986 U.S. tax code
ieir was the General Utilities doctrine, according to which if a firm's assets
are were sold in a liquidation, capital gains taxes could be avoided at the
corporate level. After such an acquisition, the target's assets could be
or redepreciated, presumably using the accelerated schedules of the 1980s.
ter The step-up in basis could have been an important tax motivation for
acquiring old capital. In addition, of course, there are tax gains from
leverage. Although these apply equally to firms without too much fixed
'ith capital, it may be more costly for these firms to obtain debt financing.
the If managers oppose a loss of control to an acquirer, they can lever up
as- by themselves or lever up and step up the basis by effecting a man-
ant agement buyout or finding a white knight. These, in fact, have been
bit common responses to hostile pressure.
One final explanation for hostile offers that is consistent with our
the findings is underpricing by the market. If the stock market does not
iey value some firms properly, an acquirer who understands their intrinsic
ets value may be able to buy their assets more cheaply on the stock market
he than on the new or used capital goods market. Managers reluctant to
a give up assets at below their intrinsic worth would resist such acqui-
ck sitions. One problem with this explanation of hostile bids is that it says
nothing about why the older, slow-growth companies with mostly tan-
gible assets are the only ones undervalued on the stock market. More-
Ic. over, since once a company is in play the corporate control market
nd becomes very competitive and a great deal of information is revealed,
acquirers are definitely limited in their ability to profit in this way.
1.4 In summary, hostile targets appear to have sharply distinguishable
el. asset characteristics. Relative to the market value of the firm, they
nd appear to have a considerable amount of old tangible capital. They are
growing slowly and have heavy debts. Although these characteristics
ed suggest that hostile acquisitions might be related to the desire to pur-
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with this general story. In particular, incompetent management, asset firni
redeployment, free cash flow, taxes, and underpricing of the firm's of a
assets by the market could all invite takeover bids. At the same time, the
we think the evidence is consistent with the notion that hostile take- sin
overs are motivated by the need for disciplinary action against the firr
target management. an
The analysis of this section has said virtually nothing about the ing
targets of friendly bids. Except for the fact that they are on average sid
smaller and six years younger than the rest of the sample (with t-
statistics of —1.13and —1.97,respectively), friendly targets are very erl
similar to the average firm in the sample. Most notably, their Tobin's 4
qis not statistically or substantively different from that of the average sai
firm in the sample, and it is significantly higher than the q of an average ho
hostile target (t =2.66).In a sense these findings are consistent with vs
the view that friendly targets are just regular firms, and their acquisition els
derives from some idiosyncratic circumstances such as a life-cycle an
decision of a top officer with a large stake or a match-specific synergy
(such as the desire of the acquiring management to enter a particular ac
new business). One interesting feature of friendly targets is that they th
appear to have higher interest payouts and lower dividend payouts than T
the average firm in the sample, perhaps indicating that they are starved w
for capital. But their total outside payouts are very similar to those of it
the average firm. si
The results of this section provide the basic evidence supporting the b
notion that disciplinary takeovers are more often hostile than the av-
erage takeover, while synergistic takeovers are more often friendly. I'
The evidence indicates that hostile targets are older, poorly performing I
firms, possibly with many old plants or equipment that should be aban- S
doned or more profitably deployed elsewhere. This is exactly what one
would expect of the targets of disciplinary takeovers. In contrast, the
financial characteristics of friendly targets do not appear to be very
different from those of the average firm in the sample. If what attracts
I
acquirersto these targets are match-specific synergies (as well as the
target manager's interest in selling), we would not expect to see any
real differences in the basic financial variables. In short, the results I
suggest that the motive for a takeover might well determine its mood. I
Treating hostile and friendly acquisitions as reflecting the same under-
lying fundamentals might be very misleading indeed.
4.4Probit Estimates
The previous section offered evidence suggesting that the motives
for hostile and friendly acquisitions might be different. In this section
we present results on some further statistical tests of what makes a121 Characteristics of Targets of Hostile and Friendly Takeovers
set firm the target of a friendly takeover and what makes a firm the target
n's of a hostile takeover. This question is different from asking what makes
tie, the mood of a takeover of an already selected target hostile or friendly,
ke- since the latter question presumes that the characteristics that make
the firms targets in the first place are the same across moods. If hostile
and friendly takeovers typically reflect different motives, it is mislead-
he ing to think of a firm becoming a general target. Rather, separate con-
ge siderations are appropriate for predicting which firms are subject to
hostile (disciplinary) takeovers and which are subject to friendly (syn-
ry ergistic) ones.
Accordingly, this section presents probit estimates for the whole
ge sample of 1980 Fortune 500 firms, estimates that separately predict
ge hostile and friendly acquisitions. The models are either prob(hostile
• vs. anything else) =f(characteristics),or prob(friendly vs. anything
on else) =g(characteristics).In short, we separately compared hostile
:le and friendly targets with the rest of the Fortune 500 sample.
gy We did a multivariate analysis because many of the company char-
ar acteristics we looked at were correlated with one another. For example,
the growth rate of the firm's work force was so closely correlated with
Tobin's q that it became dominated by q in the regressions. Although
we ran several additional probits to identify the separate sources of
of influence of firm characteristics on the probability of a friendly acqui-
sition and the probability of a hostile acquisition, the results presented
below reflect our main findings.
Table 4.4a presents the two probits estimating the likelihood that a
•y. Fortune 500 firm would go through a successful friendly acquisition.
Mimicking our earlier finding that the friendly targets were just like the
sample as a whole, the probits did not reveal particularly strong cor-
relations. Specifically, the probability of a friendly acquisition is not
clearly related to the log of the firm's market value, the presence of
the founding family, industry q, or Dq. That high market value does
not deter friendly acquisitions is inconsistent with the preliminary in-
dications from table 4.3a. This could be because size is negatively
y correlated with officer ownership, which is, in turn, positively related
:s to friendly bids. In this case, the finding in table 4.3a is spurious. Since
I. friendly bids are often made by large, cash-rich companies and some-
times for stock, it is not entirely surprising that capital market con-
straints are not particularly binding.
When friendly management buyouts were included in the set of ac-
quired firms, there was some evidence that high officer ownership
promoted friendly acquisitions. This result grew weaker when these
S buyoutswere excluded, since, as we show in the next section, firms
going through friendly management buyouts often have dominant man-
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1
Table 4.4a Probit Regressions of Friendly Acquisition Dummy Variables on









Log of total market value — .0579 — .0195
(—.591) (— .191)
Founding family present =I — .122 — .162
(—.387) (—.477)
Proportion of equity owned by 1.50 1.21
top officers (1.81) (1.34)




Number of firms in regression 371 371
Note: (-statistics in parentheses
Table 4.4b Probit Regressions of Hostile AcquisitionDummyVariables on





Independent Variable Acquisition — Acquisition
I
Intercept .563 — .106
(.960) (— .177)
Log of total market value — .184 — . 116
(—2.00) (—1.24)
Founding family present = I — .737 — .604
(—1.81) (—1.50)
Proportion of equity owned by —1.33 — .888





Number of firms in regression 371 371123 Characteristics ofTargetsof Hostileand Friendly Takeovers
ownership results were generally weaker in the probits than in the
earlier tables because we lost a substantial number of observations due
to missing values for q. We had q values for only 20 friendly targets
and 31 hostile targets.
The result that as far as assets and performance go, friendly targets
are just like other firms is confirmed using both industry q and Dq.
Neither industry q nor Dq mattered for predicting friendly acquisitions.
These negative results are consistent with the notion that friendly take-
overs are motivated by synergy.
The story is very different with hostile acquisitions, the probits for
which are presented in table 4.4b. For the sample including hostile
management buyouts, the likelihood of a hostile acquisition was neg-
atively related to the log of value, negatively related to industry q, and
negatively related (at the 10 percent confidence level) to the presence
of a founder. Surprisingly, the negative effect of officer ownership on
the probability of a hostile acquisition was not statistically significant.
The result that, controlling for the q variables, high market value
deters hostile acquisitions seems likely to reflect capital market im-
perfections. It suggests that some firms are too large to be acquired
through a hostile bid, even when fundamentals dictate that they should
be. This result became substantially weaker when hostile management
buyouts were excluded from the sample of hostile targets, since these
were very small firms. In fact, these buyouts are probably the best
case for the argument that poor capital markets limit large transactions.
The results in table 4.4b also confirm our earlier finding that hostile
targets had low market valuations relative to tangible assets and that
the presence of a founder discouraged hostile action, holding officer
stake and valuation constant. This suggests that founders or their fam-
ily members fight hostile bids more effectively than other managers,
either because they value control more or because they command
shareholders' or directors' support.
One important question we could not answer by simply comparing
means is whether industry-specific or firm-specific components of per-
formance are related to hostile activity. In our estimated probits in-
dustry q had a significant negative effect on the likelihood of a hostile
acquisition, whereas Dq had an insignificant negative effect. It appears
that industry performance is a more reliable predictor of hostile bids.
Viewed in the context of the mismanagement story, this finding says
that hostile activity is often brought on by non-value-maximizing re-
sponses to adverse industrywide shocks and less often by company-
specific mismanagement in an otherwise healthy industry. The finding
that, in predicting hostile action, industry q is more important than Dq
may indicate the existence of entire industries whose assets can be
profitably redeployed. For example, many steel and textile firms mightTh
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be in need of shutdowns and selloffs that do violence to the preferences F
of existing managers. These managers are not necessarily just trying mei
to shirk or save empires. They may simply be opposed to changes that on
enrich shareholders at the expense of employees. The point is that an
hostile acquisitions can be a way to move large quantities of fixed 13(
capital into more profitable (and possibly also more productive) uses, ma
as onewould expect of disciplinary takeovers, the
Although the statistical evidence is fairly weak, it is consistent with Cal
ourobservation that the motive for friendly acquisitions is more likely coi
to be synergistic than disciplinary, and the motive for hostile ones is sui
more likely to be disciplinary than synergistic. Specifically, friendly ac-
quisitions seem to be related to high officer ownership, which suggests ha
that an important impetus for these acquisitions may be a life-cycle de- to
cision of a large shareholder. Furthermore, all other basic firm char-
acteristics we have looked at appear to be irrelevant for predicting friendly by
acquisitions. We might expect this of synergistic or diversification- fri
oriented takeovers. Hostile bids, in contrast, seem to be targeted at firms m
located in low-q industries. One interpretation of the low q finding is that In
hostile acquisitions are a way to redeploy tangible assets in a more prof- le
itable way. Many of these redeployments can either be unacceptable to c
managers (such as liquidation and employee dismissals) or can be more to
painlessly replicated by a white knight or through a management buyout 01
(suchas a step-up in depreciable basis and increases in leverage). This, is
of course, is the story of the disciplinary motive for hostile takeovers.
b
4.5ManagementBuyouts
Management buyouts are an important form of acquisition to think a
about because we know that the motive behind them cannot be syn- e
ergistic. Whatever gains realized by management buyout organizers
must come either from a more profitable exploitation of the firm's own h
resources, including its managerial talent, or from the ability of the
organizers to buy the firm's assets for less than their intrinsic worth t
under the existing operating strategy. t
Schipper and Smith (1986), Shleifer and Vishny (1988), and Kaplan I
(1987)have discussed the sources of gains in management buyouts. All
of these authors found that tax considerations, especially for leveraging
up and stepping up the basis, could justify a large part of the takeover
premium. Kaplan estimated that 80 percent of the takeover premium
can come from the tax savings. Other prime candidates for the source
of gains include buying underpriced assets, improving incentives through
higher management ownership and leverage, and the restructuring of
declining companies along the lines sought by raiders.I
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Hence, it is important to distinguish between two types of manage-
ment buyouts. The first is the buyout that responds to hostile pressure
on the target's management. This pressure can take the form either of
an outside bid or simply of an acquisition of a beachhead along with a
l3d filing to the effect that control might be sought. The fact that
managers and their investment banker partners can win the bidding for
the firm in such situations suggests that the gains from an acquisition
can be realized by them as well as by outside bidders. If these gains
come from tax savings or buying underpriced assets, this result is not
surprising. But it also seems likely that after a management buyout
managers redeploy the target's assets in better uses. Managers may
have been unwilling to implement these changes before being forced
to make a defensive bid for the firm at a large premium.
The second type of management buyout is the transaction initiated
by the managers without any apparent outside threat. We call this a
friendly management buyout. One of the motives for these takeovers
may be the exit story we developed for friendly deals more generally.
In this case the buyout can be a way for a dominant CEO to pass the
leadership on to the next generation of managers without dissipating
control. Another motive for friendly management buyouts may just be
to realize tax gains from leverage and stepping up the depreciable basis
of the firm's assets. Although another oft-cited motive for these buyouts
is to improve incentives through increased management ownership,
this seems less plausible for our sample of friendly management buyouts
because that management ownership was already quite high.
A final motive for friendly management buyouts that may be impor-
tant is for managers to buy the share of the firm's assets they do not
already own for less than its true value (either under the existing op-
erating strategy or under a new one). Of course, this story requires
that the management have some ability to freeze out minority share-
holders once it takes over, so that it can get shareholders to tender for
less than the true value of their shares. In addition, the story presumes
that competitive bidding from third parties will not drive the profit from
this strategy to zero. But both of these requirements seem likely to be
met in many cases where managers have much better information than
outsiders about the true value of the firm and management already
owns a good deal of the stock (as in our sample of friendly management
buyouts).
Of the 16 management buyouts in our sample of 82 acquisitions, 8
were hostile in the sense described above and the other 8 were friendly.
Table 4.5presentsdata on the ownership and financial characteristics
of these buyouts. Comparing this table with tables 4.la and 4.3a we
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Table 4.5 Ownership and FinancialCharacteristicsfor ManagementBuyouts
SampleFriendly MBOHostile MBO
Founding family present on top .244 .375 .125
management team =
Fractional equity ownership by top .0636 .170 .0135
two officers
Fractional equity ownership .0454 .131 .0517
by the rest of the board
Age of board chairman 58.4 59.8 62.5
q .848 .916 .436
Dq .3I8 — .0873
Replacement cost 2772.6 450.3 740.5
Growth rate of work force (GL) .0272 .0205 .0119
Year of Incorporation 1918.3 1924.3 1898.4
Total market value 2092.6 638.1 292.1
Investment/income .704 .456 .499
Dividends/income .183 .136 .185
Interest/income .193 .204 .135
Value of long-term debt/total market value .248 .373 .310
other hostile transactions. Firms experiencing them have very low To-
bin's q's, low growth rates, low investment, large amounts of debt,
and relatively low board and officer ownership. The average year of
incorporation for a hostile management buyout target is a strikingly
low 1898. These companies are much smaller than the run-of-the-mill
hostile target, and they have a lower incidence of a founder's presence.
Our examination of particular instances of hostile management buyouts
confirms the observation that they are often acquisitions of old tangible
assets, ones that can be subsequently redeployed more profitably or
redepreciated. The picture of hostile management buyouts that emerges
is consistent with their being a defensive response to the threat of a
disciplinary takeover.
Friendly management buyouts are a very different type of transac-
tion, and it is much less clear how they compare with other friendly
deals. These buyouts are management-initiated deals that are not foiled
by higher third party bids. Not surprisingly, 37.5percentof these firms
were run by the founding family, and the average board stake before
the buyout was over 30 percent.
Since the officers in friendly management buyouts often have vir-
tually complete control of the company, their motives for the trans-
action may be suspect. Purchasing undervalued shares in the presence
of coercion and disadvantaged competitive bidders seems like a distinct
possibility. Consider two cases in our sample. One was the buyout of
Metromedia at a 100 percent premium, which was followed by the sale127 Characteristics of Targets ofHostile andFriendly Takeovers
of the parts of the company (previously dictatorially run by the same
— bossfor 30 years) for more than double the acquisition price within 18
months. Another was the management buyout of Beatrice foods, fol-
lowed by the sale of several divisions that paid for the whole acquisition
(Beatrice, however, did not have dominant insider ownership). There
were other companies where management initiated a buyout when its
17 voting control was already effectively absolute, such as Levi-Strauss
and Questor.
.s In sum, although we do not have a clear idea of how friendly man-
16 agement buyouts relate to other friendly acquisitions, our consolidation
of the hostile management buyouts with the other hostile acquisitions
.5 doesnot seem to do too much violence to the data. Firms undergoing
.4 a management buyout in response to hostile threats resemble other
.1 hostile targets quite closely. In fact, we can use our knowledge of hostile
management buyouts to make inferences about hostile takeovers more
5 generally.
— 4.6Concluding Comments
The notion developed in this paper is that the motive for a takeover
'0- can have a large influence on its mood. Disciplinary takeovers are likely
to be hostile, whereas synergistic takeovers are likely to be friendly.
of Compared with the universe of Fortune 500 firms in 1980, firms
ly experiencing hostile takeover bids between 1981 and 1985 were smaller,
ill older, and more slowly growing, and they had lower Tobin's q's, more
e. debt, and less investment of their income. The low q seems to be as
LtS much an industry-specific as a firm-specific effect. In addition, the
hostile targets were less likely to be run by the founding family and
or had lower officer ownership than the average firm. A low q value, low
es market value, low growth and investment, and the absence of a founder
a were the corporate characteristics most likely to make the firm the
target of a hostile bid.
c- Compared with the universe of Fortune 500 firms, the friendly targets
ly were smaller and younger but had comparable Tobin's q values and
growth rates. The friendly targets were more likely to be run by a
member of the founding family and had higher officer ownership than
re the average firm. The decision to retire of a CEO with a large stake in
the firm or with a relationship to the founder often precipitated a friendly
r- acquisition. High officer ownership was the most important attribute
s- predicting friendly acquisitions.
We conclude that differences between synergistic and disciplinary
takeovers, captured in part by differences in their moods, should be
)f recognized in empirical work. Specifically, studies that fail to distin-
guish adequately between acquisitions with different motives can be128Randall Mórck, AndreiShleifer,and Robert W. Vishny 129
guish adequately between acquisitions with different motives can be Shleif
misleading. First, difficulties can arise when disciplinary and synergis- spo
tic takeovers are analyzed together, presenting the researcher with a bac
mix that may have few common characteristics. Our results suggest
WalkI
that, as a first cut, separating hosttle and friendly takeovers can help
address this problem. A second difficulty can occur when facts about
one type of acquisition are used to make inferences about another. An age
exampleof a good study that could be misread is Brown and Medoff's
paper in this volume. The authors found that in a large sample of small
Michigan companies, employment and wages rose after they were ac-
quired. Since most of their sample seems to consist of friendly acqui- Cot
sitions of very small firms with high management ownership, one cannot
conclude from their work that employment and wages do not fall
average after a firm is acquired in a disciplinary takeover. To get at the of th
latter question, one would have to look at hostile targets. The key
implication of our study for future work, therefore, is that research to a
results on friendly bids may have little to say about hostile bids, and one
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ui- Comment Oliver S. D'Arcy Hart
,iot
Ofl Shleifer, and Vishny's paper provides an empirical investigation
he of the characteristics of Fortune 500 firms that are the target of a
ey takeover bid, with particular emphasis on how those that are subject
ch to a friendly takeover differ from those that are subject to a hostile
nd one. The main results are that, relative to the average Fortune 500 firm,
the hostile targets are small, slow growing, in industries with a low
Tobin's q, are unlikely to be run by a founding family member, and
have low officer ownership. The friendly targets, again relative to the
average Fortune 500 firm, are small, have average Tobin's q values and
growth rates, are likely to be run by a founding family, and have high
officer ownership. The authors argue that these results are by and large
flS reasonable and supportive of the idea that the form or mood of a
n- takeover is largely determined by its motive: In particular, friendly bids
r): are likely to be associated with synergies, while unfriendly bids are
likely to be disciplinary in nature.
P. I found this paper both interesting and instructive. It is one of the
first to analyze the differences between friendly and hostile takeovers,
and it provides a wealth of useful findings. These should be particularly
cc helpful to researchers who hope to develop a theory of the determinants
of different types of takeovers. It is worth noting that we do not now
nd have such a theory. The models on takeovers in the literature focus
either on hostile bids or on friendly mergers; they do not consider the
choice between the two.' Of course, the absence of a theoretical frame-
work makes a detailed interpretation of the authors' results difficult.
of My attempts in this direction should therefore be regarded as both
n:
Oliver S. D'Arcy Hart is professor of economics at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology.
id 1. For examples of the former see Blair. Gerard, and Golbe (1986), Grossman and
Hart (1988), and Hams and Raviv (1988); and of the latter see Grossman and Hart (1986).
I should mention a recent paper that does study the choice between friendly mergers
and hostile bids: Berkovitch and Khanna (1986).
*'l
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provisional and tentative. I should also note that my interpretation numb
does not differ greatly from the authors' own, in th
A reasonable starting point for the authors' analysis is the idea that As
a hostile bid is costlier than a friendly one, and hence, ceteris paribus, friend
an acquirer would prefer a friendly transaction. There are many reasons infori
for this. To mention a few, hostile bids are likely to be costlier because one
the acquirer may have to overcome various defences and resistance predi
tactics from incumbent management, such as poison pills and lawsuits; the Ii
the acquirer may have to pay more for the firm than otherwise if man- hosti
agement resists by a recapitalization plan or a restructuring or by en- of a
couraging a white knight to make a counter-offer (or by engaging in a fnen
management buyout); a hostile bid may alienate incumbent managers abou
and may make it difficult for the acquiring firm to work with them after prob
control has changed hands; and the acquirer may find it more difficult to a
to freeze out minority shareholders in a (two-stage) merger without mam
management's approval of the bid as "fair." Th
The fact that hostile bids are costlier has an interesting implication. us ac
In a world of symmetric information and costless bargaining between syne
the acquirer and the target management, no hostile bids should ever on tt
take place! This is simply a consequence of the Coase theorem. The over
argument is clear for the case in which a hostile bid would succeed term
with certainty: Management, recognizing that the writing is on the wall, the
will be prepared to agree to a (cheaper) merger in return for a small man
sidepayment (for example, a golden parachute). But the argument also they
applies to the case in which the bid outcome is uncertain. In fact, it is In c
a simple consequence of the Coasian idea that two parties will always reqi
negotiate to a point on the efficiency frontier. Here, since a hostile bid can
is more expensive than a friendly bid, an efficient outcome can only gett
be a friendly merger together with some sidepayment, or no merger at con
all, it is.
We can learn two lessons from this observation. First, to understand pen1
the occurrence of hostile bids, we must introduce imperfections into Pro
the bargaining process, such as asymmetric information or limits to ativ
managerial sidepayments.2 Second, a bid can appear friendly without I
being so. If management agrees to a merger because the alternative is disk
to be the subject of a hostile bid, it seems inappropriate to label this cos
as a friendly transaction. Yet that is the way it will appear in the data. disc
M&ck, Shleifer, and Vishny recognize this problem, but there is little ergi
they can do about it.It should be borne in mind, therefore, that a mai
3.
2. These limits may be reasonable. If managers accept a large sidepayment in return is in
for agreeing to a merger, their action might be regarded as a breach of fiduciary respon- a re
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ion number of the bids the authors have classified as friendly really belong
in the hostile category.3
hat As I have noted, a theory that can explain both hostile bids and
friendly mergers will have to incorporate such features as asymmetric
)flS information and sidepayment limits. Until such a theory is available,
use one can only guess at the conclusions it will yield. Some plausible
ice predictions, however, are that: the higher the costs of a hostile bid,
its; the less likely it is that such a bid will be attempted; to the extent that
an- hostile bids can be used to coerce management, an increase in the cost
en- of a hostile bid might also be expected to reduce the probability of a
n a friendly bid; and if for some reason managers become less concerned
ers about losing control (because, for instance, they want to retire), the
probability of a friendly bid will rise both in absolute terms and relative
uk to a hostile bid (there is no reason to incur the costs of a hostile bid if
)ut management will relinquish control voluntarily).
These ideas can help us understand some of the authors' results. Let
)n. us accept their point that the motive for a takeover is likely to be either
en synergistic or disciplinary. A synergistic takeover is more likely to rely
'er on the cooperation of the incumbent managers than a disciplinary take-
he over. The former is being carried out to take advantage of some ex-
ed ternality between the operations of the two firms rather than because
tll, the current management is doing a bad job. Replacing the incumbent
all managers is unlikely to yield significant benefits, and, to the extent that
so they are good at what they are doing, it may result in significant costs.
is In contrast, almost by its nature, a disciplinary takeover is unlikely to
ys require the cooperation of the incumbents. A disciplinary takeover is
id carried out either because the managers are incompetent, in which case
ily getting rid of them will yield a positive benefit, or because they are
at competent but are enjoying too many managerial perquisites. Although
it is true that in the latter case keeping management on with reduced
nd perks might be desirable, when the two cases are taken together, the
to probability that managerial cooperation is required is likely to be ret-
to atively low.
Ut To the extent that a loss of managerial cooperation is one of the
is disadvantages of a hostile bid (see above), we may conclude that the
us costs of a hostile bid are higher in a synergistic takeover than in a
a. disciplinary one. Hence, we would expect to see relatively many syn-
:le ergistic takeovers consummated as friendly transactions and relatively
a many disciplinary bids as hostile ones. The absolute number of friendly
3.This problem is lessened by the fact that the authors classify a bid as hostile if it
rn is initially resisted by management, even if management eventually accepts the bid (or
In- a revised version of it). It would be interesting, by the way, to know how many bids
change mood in this way.132Randall Mtkck, Andrel Shlelfer, and Robert W. Vishny 133
disciplinarybids may not be insignificant, however, to the extent that whet
some apparently friendly transactions are actually aform of coercion the fi
(the iron fist in the velvet glove), that
Of course, if we could distinguish between synergistic and disciplin- As ti
• ary transactions in the data, we would have a good test of these ideas. in a
Unfortunately, we cannot. What the authors have done, however, is whjc
to identify characteristics of targets that make them likely to fall into the
one of the two categories rather than the other. For example, slowly a wI
growing, low-q firms are arguably badly managed and therefore ap- trick
propriate targets for a disciplinary takeover. We thus might expect new
relatively many bids for these firms to be hostile, which indeed they it is
are. On the other hand, firms with high officer ownership may be better That
run because management operates under a good incentive scheme. As the
a result, to the extent that these firms are taken over, it islikely to be to ri
for synergistic reasons, and we might expect relatively many of these in ti
transactions to be friendly. To put it another way, the managers of firms robt
with high officer ownership have a direct interest in the market value L
of their firm as well as in managerial perks. They are therefore likely
to welcome a friendly bid at a premium even if it does involve their the
losing control. Since the effective cost of a friendly bid is lower for con
them, we would expect the probability of a friendly bid to rise both con
relatively (to a hostile bid) and absolutely. This is what is observed in age
the data. fert
There is another possible explanation for why officer ownership af- tha
fects the nature of a takeover. If officer ownership is high, management a si
may have sufficient voting strength to block the takeover. In this case toc
a takeover can succeed only with management's permission, which. fin
again argues for a friendly transaction. As the authors note, however,
this control idea does not explain why high officer ownership is as- pu
sociated with a higher absoluteprobabilityof a takeover. In contrast, ha
the previous incentive idea is consistent with this finding. mt
Other of the authors' results can be explained similarly. For example, frii
the presence of a founding family member is likely to make a hostile ag
bid more difficult to the extent that founders have a stronger preference pta
for control as well as a better ability to resist. It is therefore not sur- evi
prising that the probability of a hostile bid is seen to fall under these thi
conditions. Interestingly, although one might expect the probability of
a friendly bid to fall, too, in the presence of a founding family, this ch
turns out not to be the case. en
Of all the authors' results one in particular qualifies as a major par-
adox. Shleifer, and Vishny find that what makes the probability foi
of a hostile bid high is not a firm's q but the q of the industry it is in.
This find is quite surprising since one would naturally suppose that a to•
good indicator of managerial competence (or slack)—and hence of a 1133Characteristicsof Targets of Hostile and Friendly Takeovers
tat whether the firm is a likely candidate for a disciplinary takeover—is
the firm's q relative to that of its industry. Note that lam not suggesting
that the industrywide q should not affect the likelihood of a hostile bid.
As the authors note, one can imagine general shocks that lead to slack
in a whole industry; they give the example of the decline in oil prices,
which should have led to a fall in exploration activity but did not. To
to the extent that this problem arises because the incumbent managers as
'ly a whole find it difficult to adapt to a new environment (to learn new
tricks), disciplinary takeovers may be called for to replace them with
ct new, more flexible managers (as Jensen 1986 has argued). Nevertheless,
ey it is still very surprising that only industrywide q should be important.
er That is, one would expect idiosyncratic shocks hitting firms to have
the similar implication that a disciplinary takeover may be called for
be to replace outmoded management. This apparently does not show up
se in the data, however. It would seem very desirable to examine the
as robustness of this conclusion in future empirical work.
ue Let me close with a few other suggestions for future work. First, to
ly obtain further information on whether high officer ownership reduces
:ir the probability of a hostile tender offer for incentive reasons or for
or control reasons, researchers may want to study the small number of
th companies that have dual classes of shares. In these companies man-
in agement's profit share and its voting strength can be significantly dif-
ferent from each other. In fact, DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985) found
1- that management typically has more than 50 percent of the votes but
nt , asignificantly smaller fraction of the shares. It is possible, therefore,
se to distinguish between the incentive and the control effects among these
:h. firms.
r, Second, the idea that low-q firms are taken over for disciplinary
s- purposes would receive further support if the firms that acquired them
had high q values (showing that they were well run). It would be
interesting to know if the data reflect this. Third, to the extent that a
e, friendly merger occurs because cooperation from the incumbent man-
le agement is important, we would expect the incumbent to continue to
play a significant role in the new, merged company. Although obtaining
r- evidence on this is likely to be difficult, it would be useful to know if
there is even casual support for this idea.
Finally, as I noted above, the development of a formal theory of the
IS choice between hostile and friendly bids would be very valuable. Those
embarking on such a theory will find the results of this paper very
r- instructive. The hope is that the relationship will be a two-way one: A
:y formal theory will improve our understanding of the determinants of
1. the different types of bids and sharpen our ideas about the regularities
a to look for in the data. Let us hope that it is not too long before such
atheory is available.134 RandallM,lrek, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny 135
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Comment Michael C. Jensen
ac
The paper by Shleifer, and Vishny contributes significantly to
our knowledge of the takeover process. Analyzing all 454publicly
traded firms in the Fortune 500in1980, they find 82 firms, or 18.1 tc
percent, were taken over in the years 1981—85 (including the 16 firms
that went private in management buyouts). Of these 82 transactions 40
started out as hostile contests and 42 were friendly.
The authors analyze the differences between the ownership, asset,
and performance characteristics of the targets of friendly bids and those ei
of hostile bids to help identify the sources of the takeover gains. They
conclude that combinations motivated by gains from the synergies re-
suIting from combining two firms' assets and operations are more likely
to occur with friendly mergers, and that takeovers motivated by the
gains associated with disciplining poorly performing managers are more
likely to be hostile. The hostile targets were poor performers, as mea- ti
sured by their Tobin's q ratios in 1980. The hostile targets had signif-
icantly lower q values than the friendly targets, were concentrated in a
low-q industries, and tended to have lower q values within their
industries. fi
1•
Michael C. Jensen is professor of finance at the Harvard Business School and the
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The evidence indicates friendly targets are younger and faster grow-
ing than hostile targets and are indistinguishable from the sample as a
ar: whole on the performance dimension. The authors argue we would not
US
expect the synergy gains from merging the target with another firm to
ing be related to any general performance measures, and they therefore
is- conclude that the average performance of the friendly targets means
the gains from these mergers come from synergies. This seems to be
mg a weak argument because the alternative hypotheses are not well
specified.
er- The evidence does indicate, however, that the hostile targets tended
to be older, more slowly growing firms, whose market values averaged
only 52.4 percent of their replacement cost, whereas that of the friendly
-DI targets averaged 79.6 percent. The top two managers of the hostile
targets owned considerably less stock of their firms than did the man-
agers of the friendly targets, at 3.2 percent versus 14.5 percent, and
they were much less likely to be a founder or members of a founding
family. Forty percent of the friendly targets were managed by founders
or members of the founding family, whereas 10 percent of the hostile
targets and 24.4 percent of the sample as a whole were so managed.
The intentional exit of the founding family or of a CEO with a very
large stake in the firm seems to be a common cause of friendly
acquisitions.
to The authors conclude that the motive for friendly acquisitions is
IY likely to be synergistic, whereas in hostile ones it is more likely
.1 to be disciplinary." Hostile targets were older, slow growing firms that
iS were investing a smaller fraction of earnings than the average firm in
• the sample and whose capital was valued by the market at less than
• half its replacement cost—all of which is consistent with the theory of
t, the agency costs of free cash, which predicts that managers will gen-
erally disinvest too slowly. I agree with the authors' conclusions, but
there are a number of things the authors did not examine that would
have considerably improved our understanding of the issues.
IY The authors did not consider takeover attempts that were unsuc-
cessful, that is, attempts in which the target firm remained independent.
Their conclusions apply only to friendly or hostile acquisition targets
that were eventually taken over. The authors therefore missed an op-
portunityto tell us something about firms that were more likely to fail
at a friendly deal or more likely to successfully fight off a hostile offer.
I also wish the authors had presented data on the total gains generated
from the friendly takeovers versus those from the hostile takeovers.
Historical evidence indicates the gains in mergers (which tend to be
friendly) are lower than the gains in tender offers (which tend to be
hostile). But we do not know what the gains to be explained are in
these two different samples. Moreover, Grimm (1986) has shown there136Randall Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny
were only 118 contested tender offers over the years 198 1—85, and so
the 32 hostile offers (eliminating the 8 hostile management buyouts, 5
whichthe authors define as preceded by a takeover offer or a 13d filing
with control intentions) represent only 27 percent of all the hostile
offers during the period. It is interesting that such a high proportion
of hostile offers occurs among the largest firms. Indeed, the proportion
was undoubtedly higher than this because the authors did not report
the number of unsuccessful offers for targets that remained independent.
The authors base their conclusions on the performance of hostile vs.
friendly targets solely on the differences in q values in 1980 for the 20
friendly and 31 hostile targets for which they have data on q values.
It would be useful to have measured performance by prior earnings
and stock price changes as well, to see if these measures of performance
add anything to our understanding of the differences in these firms.
This calculation would also have increased the effective sample size
of the targets for which performance data exist. It appears that the
targeted firms had a disproportionately large frequency of cases for 5.
which no q values existed; 37.3 percent of the firms with no q values
were targets, whereas 13.7 percent of the firms with q values were
fi targets. There may be a systematic reason for this and for the fact that
only 25percentof the hostile firms did not have q values, whereas 47.6
S
percentof the friendly targets did.
Finally, it would also have been useful if the authors had examined
in detail the changes that occurred after takeover in each of the firms,
to see if there were systematic differences between the hostile and
friendly deals. The authors conjecture that the changes that occur after
f hostile transactions—for example, liquidation of assets or employee
dismissals— are less acceptable to the incumbent managers than those
following friendly ones and that this explains their opposition to the
takeover. The exact nature of the changes in assets, liabilities, man-
agement, employment, and operating strategies would give us a much
better understanding of the sources of the gains. But this, of course,
would be another paper.
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